How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions by Berent Enç

Author:Berent Enç [Enç, Berent]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
ISBN: 0199256020

It is clear how the two cases involving Catherine and Kate violate the knowledge condition. Indeed, I am sure Gibbons would also argue that cases (3) and (4) fail to be intentional because they again violate the knowledge condition. Close as Gibbons's condition is to my explanatory requirement, the two are not coextensional. There are cases of intentional action where the explanatory requirement is satisfied but where there fails to be knowledge. And there are also cases where there is knowledge (understood in terms of a reliability theory) but in which the act is non-intentional. To see the first type of case, it is sufficient to remember the contrast mentioned earlier between causal theories of knowledge and causal theories of action.44 (I take up the second type of

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